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Plans and Social Actions
s t rac t
Our understanding of a story is highly deendent uon
our a.ilitty to recognize tne underlying purpose for actions
aEscried in the story. re need to view those actions o s
rteps in, or actions to plans. urtner-ore, we need
interpret tnern nith respect to our beliefs aoout tne worl,
including our beliefs about the beliis held by tn:-
cinaracters. Similarly, our understanding of texts in eer
i3 strongly influenceo by our beliefs about the purposes of
tne autnor.
inis paper exaraines the skills and knowle -e .ne ed to
uner•astana plaIns an social actions. Following a .eneral
aiscussion of the issues, there are applicat'ions of a p1ln and
social action analysis to understandin e oisodes and
understandino author's intentions.
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Plans and Social Actiorn
1. introducLtion- Ai untional View ofi L an_,-ua -ie
Viewing an action as a step in a. plan provides an
ora'nizational schemia for events in the social world just as
h- concept of pnysica causality does for .events in the
urely prEysical world. because the perception of plarns pla.ys
.a entral role in our structurirng of reality, it 'nay acc oun
lo r .iany reading comrprehension difficulties. Tnne person  o
is difticulty in recognizing, pl.lns and social actions in te1
j navior of ot ners will have difficulty in understan in
Sis o d e s related in wIritten fo r. Ine oerso wo h can
,riuderstand episodes in daily life will still have difficulty
1ii he or she cannot understand tne con ection tweo
purposefui behavior and its conventional lin istic
Sexression. The person o does not understand t h
conl ica t ive intent of a text will h ave a seriou
comprehension proolem. Thus, the recognition o" plans nas
implications for understandingt the actions of characters in
narrative as well as understanding the action nerformed by an
a. u t i o r.
Plans and social actions nave oeen the focus of wor.< in
social nsychology [Heider, 1958], cognitive-social_ psycnolocy
L cnhi p  t , 1976], developmental ps y c no lo .y [Piaiet, 12D?;e- -%yr /% 'I ,-%"- -i ý I l%.i v7--
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ePdiak , 10741; philosophy [Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, 1975,
157 a, o], yonolin'.u istics [rC ark and Lucy, 19751,
socilinuistics [Su.dnow, 1972], liinuistics [Gordon and
La of , 1071; Sdoci, 1074 , and artificia l intelli :e nce
[r:ruc, 1975; Conen and Perrulti, 1976; Schmidt and Sridharan,
1976]. Tnis work nas shown r first, that understandingt pl.ans
.s a critical part of understanding- actions; second, that
tne ability to understand plans is one of tine inost coC ol
innierenItial tasks that people acconplis; anrd tnird, that,
oenaps because of tne inherent complexity, cnildren require
any years to develop the needed skills. Tnese years include
-rie a es ,when tne transition to skilled readin is assu:Sed to
Tnis paper sketches some of tne components of e mod l for
' dne un erstaLnding of plans and social actions. The model is
f'irst applied to narrative text, wherein actions of characters
nee to be interpreted as social actions. The emphasis on
social actions and plans leads to a distinction between story
an l si s and story Iodoel anl is. (i.e., analysis of a
read er's riodel or tne story). Next, tne m.odel is appli e to
texts in .jeneral, wherein the author's action of writing needs
to be interpreted as an action done to achieve a social :oal.
Linally, the paper discusses inplications for teacbing and
further research.
PFans and Social Actions
r. eiteroretni n Ptions
A peron l earns to interpr"et events in tne ý orld in ways
Sat reflect different explanatory systems. ; A ,i.ven (event may
Save, for examp. both a physical and a biol ica
interpretation wvnen the events are actions p erformed
pol, ad .itional explanatory syst'ems b ecoe re vant. Tn
p r icular, conventional interpretationrs of oersonal .actions
o oeyond physical and pnysioloical levels to inclue n otios
Liie "rule", "gKoal", and "intention". In this pa er we will
;- ost concerned with tne levels of' expanation for personal
at ion toat include these laetter notions. Toe follori.
:x ple s old1 clarify vwhat ais re nt here.
Ima;ine tIhat you observe a person na.ned Susie perftorm an
ctoion. At one level you r:.iiht describe her action as "Su.i
ie ner ar.- up and down causin a a p int brusn to ove .ile
in contact ith a chair until the c air was covered ith
paint". At a second level you miiiht describe her action i
S i i n t e i r , th us both s u m r i z i n d r e i n e p i n .'t
tne action described above. You could also descrie Susi.e's
action as "helping Mvartna paint" if it satisfies a set of
rules whicn constitute the definition of "help". That "help"
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,sC be defined by a set of ues le about beliefs becomes clear
w:en e consid er what it is about Susi 's action that make.s us
vw it as a elping acti.on. C ,ertainly iL is more than just
te 1 ysica-physiolo icl facts or even the propo i io
ontent oft her act, for the sare action could also be seen as
nin, or an "explo i tin". i re have to know that a
aaj a goa. of painting the c air, that this ca,1 satisfie
so~iv want or need of ,artiha, tnat iSusie believed that Mart-i
-;I Mie painting of the chair as a .oal, etc.
An action m.ay be described at a variety of levels. Te
tnree out linea above are merely indic.tve of this fat. As
.. nave se-en, a "m'ovin, of a paint brush", a -caint in -
r- ' r_ c.-, no t t) t-i f r t"n lping" I a e t diff erent atcts bu udifferen  way s of
concetuializin' the samne act [cf. Bobroz and , ino-'rad, 1 077
. ooe a nO ew 1ell, 1 7]. Th e concept of "e ov in a oint
.r-usnL" difrfers fromr tne concept of "helpin:" in thai t the rules:
for its use are primarily physical-physiologNical, while tre
rules for "helping" are primarily social. Tis is not to
say that there are no physical-physiological correlates of a
particular instance of "helping", but only that the concept
su mmarizes a set of i eliefs about the oals and beliefs of an
acTor. The level of Deliefs cannot in principle be reduced to
cne physical-physiological level, but even if it could, it
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' ppea rs that peo le's reasoning about actions (and ence 'th e
lan ua e tney use to discuss actions) doss not make that
ireuction . So'e definitions f cns f a tions at the intentional
Level a.re :iv e n in [ ruc , 175 .
One implication of the different aspects of a;cti.ons is
cta: stories can oe un.derstood by .linkin.c tonethner actions at
.ii~erent levels. As Cnristie and Schumacher [c1975] hIave
non (for children in rrades K, 2,5 ) te derree of
cornnectivity (or "relevance") of an idea unit to the main line
of a story nas significant effects on the likelinood or its
recall. CUildren may nave difficulty in the interoretaiorn of
an accion at a -iven level or in the conI netions to e *.ade to,
ot~ler actions. 'They iy even have. difficulty in determr inin
.o-t action (at tie social level) is ueing carried out. ror
exa'iple a speaKer might be asking a question, .ivina an order,
or iaking a statement; a painter ;Ii.7 t be nelpirn or har-: in.
ti•e ability to interpret acLions in terms of their
p resued purpose be g ins to develop early in one's life ut
im provs over •any years. In act, the .exresi of
inrtention oegins before a cnild begins to speak FFruner, 1i)r,
17.], is evident at the single-word utterance stafe [Dore,
197-1], san is elaborated over many years of development to the
- 7 -
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co fmplexities o  adul  languag e use [Shatz, 177; see also the
analysis of "pro.aise" in Se-arle, 1969]
'ine int-erretatloM! o intentions is perhaps a di ff e r ent
matter. Piaget [19321 noted tnat younger children appear to
,:i;.<e ble and praise judgments more on outcomes of actions
L na on t pe ap arent i nention behind tnem, whereas older
cnildrcn rely more on intent. t hether this observation
refl ects a difference in the criteria forr moral judgments or a
ditierence in perceived intentions is difficult to determine,
out recent studies [Feld man, et al. , 195; SedlaK,
Ssu est nat th e coi•plexi ty of problem solvinf requlired to
p!er'ceive intentions, and therefore the memory and processinn
Se.1ancds on tne child, results in differencces in the perceived
intoention. berr- ,Cross [ 17] , for instance, su escts that
even 6-year old children are capable of responding to the
L-vel of intentions beiind actions in a story. It appears
Ut at younger children can perceive intentions and do use that
perception in evaluatinrg actions, but they have diff"iculty in
constructing the elaborate nypotieses about plans tnat are
sometim~es needed.
Tne reason why our ability to interpret actions (or take
on other roles) takes time to develop is still an open
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:question. Given the complexity of the necessary skills (see
o elo), it is not surprising that the development of the
ability to und ersan d intentions takes years to develop.
urt('urermore, the knoeledge required must be accumIulited from, a
variety of sources including one's own plan formulation and
inLrractions iitn otners. Such triings as thie types o.f objei ts
:ad people affected in stories have been snosjn to have teffects
on chil.dren's j udgments of intentionality [Inmoonl, 197
-ernd and berndt, 1975]. iThe years vwnen one learns tthe
appropriate conventions include the years when tee trnsit ion
to siilled reading is assumed to occur,
on• the skill s and no wl ede ne ed to interret
act:ions at c e intentional level are tce follioinog:
(1) 'ine ability to plan, i.e. to formulate a sequence o
actions leading to a oal. [S Facerdoti, 1 7 ], and t
recognize tne actions of others in ter-ns of their presu.med-
<cals. The eff'ect of tne actions -ay be to reach ty
ooal, to enale other actions, or to motivate someone else
to act (or not to act) [Schridtt and Sridharan, 1o76].
(2) Knowledge of how certain social actions are typically
carried out (e."., "giving"1 often involves a pnysical
transfer). iKnowlede of the preconditions and outcomes of
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action at all levels. Knowled e of the normative
beiaviors associated witn social actions and situations.
Knowlede of social situations and the roles people take.
(3) i'•e a ility to dic inguish one's beliefs fro: on0e's
Oeliebs about another's belief's; also, the ability to
nandle po)ssibly inconsistent data about the beliefs and
p lans o f ot e rs
(4) ;nowledie of socia1l action patterns, i.e., the sequences
that typically occur.
Inese are discussed in the next section.
. Understandin in Terms of Plans and Social f ctions
?.1 ilans and Goals
;e learn early in life to interpret actions in t'erms of
cieir purposes. Inat must we kno.v to understand the purpo .s
.; id soeo ne ' behavior? Heider [15 1 a nswers vith t
Sosiuatei that decidint that a oerson has cer ormed (causce)
an action (or outcome) comm;its us to the judgments that he or
she can cause the action (or outcome) and is motivated to do
cause (p,x) => can (p,x) & try (p,x)
wvnerer p is a person and x is an action. "Motivation" should
ne taken here in the )'eneral sense that the outcome (as
- 10 -
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oerceived y the actor) facilit.- (in the actor's ,ind) th
a.cainment of some .3oal of te actor. For example if someone,
nK•o is observed to Dne olding a box that is wrapped in fancy
paper .itn a riboon, places that box in someone else's :ans,
i hen we may a.ssume that the first person _ave a pr esenit.
bolicay, if e persons are labeled p and pF , and theb:
Sox, i, we would have
cause (p1, rive (p1,p?,b))=> can (pl, kive (p1,p2,b))
& try (pl, give (p1,p2,b))
oai,-es i r the try component of blider's axiom- eissentiallv
resoe to coron-sense notio n of why peope do thinv s A
[Lci. o idt, 1071 , since it is at tnat vel ere ersons
reason aolt t n e :act ions o f ot e r s.
1±e can component of Hbeider's axiom says that if' a person
causes an action tnen he or sCe can do that action. .ein
-l)le to do something: ;ay ,,ean that certai :n physical anid sKi
Son i tions ar e n t. But it may also ea n t ht t ese
c o rn iti.ons c a n b e b r o unt a o t. T u s we ' a y i n fSe r t h a t
"Henry can - to thle store" if ne can drive is car tere;
can *rive his car if ne can find tne keys; he can find toe.
keys if ne can find the pants ihe left them in, and so on. In
other words, we want -to say that a person can do so5.ethinc if
ne or she can do it directly, or can do some other action t;ia- t
enables it to be done directly.
- 11 -
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i.ut tne proolem is even more complicated, Someone else
-ly oe aible to enable the action. In that case, the first
person cwil succed itf he or she can motivate (cf. the tr,
acomponent) the second person to enable the action. This ea
tnat tne perception of a purposeful act may require Ute
oscr ver to simulate the planningn process of theo actor, and,
in so oing, simul.ate the planni:ng process of a third party.
Pian perception and plan generation are thus inextricablyv
linK.i'ed, in a way tha accounts for much of tne djifficulty for
each - ask, and he.nce for the perception of' intentions.
In order to do plan recognition (and hence, simulation of
tne planni:n benavior of other) a reader must possss s a set of
well elaborated types of knolede:- and processicnr, abilities,
[Schnmidt and Srida.ran, 1 7 1. Tne coordination, of these
abilities forces a reader into a hypothesis cased mode of
comprehension [of. Goodman, 1°73~, in which cerceived olans
are constantly being evaluated and refined.
.2 ocial Actions
hecognizing a social action involves knowing its typical
realizations as well as its internal structure. For example,
"buying" implies beliefs about ownership and free exchange,
and it has a typical realization in terms of m':oney and object
- 12 -
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-transers. Und.erstanding an action also imolies knowine wh.at
c o n d i i o n a re a. r o p ri a t e for an ac t o n t o o c u r ( the
oeconjit ojhs) as L 'i1 a s w.hat is tyoically true afteriwards
(te ouco,~c -  co ditios) . Cnildren ay fail to dis.cover the
struture of a story if hey fail to generate all the outcomes
or ,n acuion, includin, the issolications of out-ooes. cr
exa:ip.- , 'Sally iade rbne t:ni •  out" has as one of its out >co..,::
ne t•act tnat the inning is over. Tey 'ay also a.ve trouble
if tney fail to generate all oreconditions of an action,. T.
exa.ple aoove presupposes ttat Sally is playin, a .a- of
baseball. Finally, one ust discover connections et ween
preconditions and cutcomes of actions in order to construct a
connected sequence of actions whion f ollw fro one an
S:ec 'ion 4.2 srinows that these links between a ctions are crucia
Jor un•derst a n d ina evc en a s im n1. story.
A special case of actions that require interpretation at
c:e ilitentional level is the speech act, or rore broadly, the
linL uitic act. LiKe otner social actions, speech acts can s e
described at various levels. t tne physica l-hysiolo.ical
Level e have thei "utteranc act" [earle, 1•0 0 ]. -or
,exaplIe, an utterance act light have the descriotion
etcsy uttered the sounds,
/' th a. t/ /' o 1 a n / / i s/ /' s i </
- 1 -
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S >eech act also can be :iven a propositional description.
ontu inuin our example iwe could say that Betsy's statement
refers to thie "that pl1ant" and pcredicate s "is sicK".
cpeecn a ct also nave intentional descriptions, or in
Austin 's 1062u] terminolog y, "illocutionary force". If we
Selieve that Betsy believes her statement, that she believes
se as e:vidence for it, t thtat se eliv t it is not
obvious to her listeners that the state,:ent is true, tnst sIh
nts iher listeners to believe the stateiment, and per.haps
otherl conditions, then we •ih t e s rie her a ct s
assert in;". At yet another level .we ihit describe her
action in terms of its role in a larger plan, e.. , as tih
an sw;er to a question or as .part of a general inlorminr plan.
-s i es th  case for social actions in general, there are.... vl. ..o  at  - 
,iner level descriptions for speech acts that depend :nore
0ano ore eupon beliefs and social conventions.
Recent work [Scihweller, BrewIer and Ianl, 1r'761 ha:s shoLn
'tha people tend to remermber the underlyine i  illocutionary
Lorce of an utterance, often at the expense of its literal
torm. In fact, even the perlocutionary effects (e.., i 1 I
"threaten" you may become "fri;ih tened") may lead to false
recognition errors. Processingr at the intentional level is
- 1U -
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Lnrus apparently automatic at times. It is nott knovwn how
successful c il ren are at this intenti onal pr oce ssin, t
oarticularly with rIespect to text, where te cues become more
abstract andr subte , where tie co•plexity in term.s of acntors
7ana oals increases, anid i:nhere very indirect forms need to
in. rpreted in. terms of ultiple intentions.
Q
.? teliets
In order to recognize anotner's intentions we need to
ae nis or nr erective on the world . ohilberr [ Q1061
ana3 el-an [ 1971] havye ,shown that role--takirn is corr elate
oi the ability to make sophi.sticatesd o•ral jud'i•,-nts (i.e.,
.ju : ients ased 7on the perceived purpose f n act ion .
Y sent [ 1976 , stud yi. s b j ects in grades 9, 1C, 12, and
college, found t at di ferentiation aon social roles
increases even at those ages.
Taking another's perspective is one of several
complexities in memory org..anization t:at are required for
understandin oclans and social actions. Problems are suct, as:
How do we account for the ability to takeb anothe'' s
perspective when that perspective ;ay -ntail taking ,our
perspective again? 1ow many levels of perspective taking are
there? [Strawson, 196 ; Scniff'er, 1Q72]. How do w;e represent
- 1 -
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'je )dependence of one belief on others? low do we represent
itering c ertainties about beliefs? One tnin, needed is a
erory in whicr iemns become true ("visirle") in certain
contexts [Cohen ad Per'rault, 1Q76]. For exam-le, that rBost
s cold jn January may be true in my worldu, and in my view o(f
youkr woorll, out perhaps not in my view of your view of y
w4orld. see -e tion . for a further discussion of er - e
lIiefs. 7These problems are only part of the entire issue of
o 1eifs and their role in co m.prehension.
.r Patterns of bsehavior
One way in wnich a person can cope witi the co!plexities
iolnerent in social action (and speech act) recoTnition i to
lOOK for patterns of interactional behavior. Patterns recur
o cause tie outcomes and reconditions of certain •actio.
, atch eac other. s a sequence of ac i on un n f t the
conditions for subsequent actions to occur may change. Thus
re vious actions play an important role in detlternin- ten
environment for later ones. ct ion patterns represnt
su. aries of .any sequences of action; thus, they are
efficient though occasionally faulty mechanisms for predictinr
or accounting for beoavior. Some patterns have a sinole and
explicit coal-orientation, but others (like the
- 1: -
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beaching/learning. pattern below) may not. Abelson [ 1075] uses
te term "script" for the general pattern and "plan" for the
-oal diirected pattern.
T'here are a multitude of action patterns which fit the
iescription given above. One special type includes patterns
that nve b ecome r i t :ualized, often em edded in the lar nua.
Bor example, the intercnane -
"hello!"
".ij! Kow a.r you?"
"Fine; and you?"
coruld De a typical c reetinai. It is not diff'icult to im ine a
cr r for such res tiOnts whi0c nerrates -anyr of th
.iterns we use [cf. Beckar, 1975]. Furthermore, its cl
' ti the worhs in these patterns have lost nuch of their
noriginal sig ific nce. We usually do not want a Jraph ic
answer to the greeting "How are you?". Instead, the ohrase is
serving~as asn unanalyzed symbol in the "hreetin" :rar:ran.
oill.rore [1971] shows, however, that even these rituals can
only be neuristics for action, and not conditioned responses.
A rioner example of a behavior pattern is one bhich .i-nt
,e observed in a school or other teachion and leanin.
- 17 -
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ituation. This opatern includes ta:lkingr, writing on par or
a oiac•:oard, and possibly a lot of gesturing or silences tor
Ibi-i'inc: . r'urther•rore the content of the talKinmg- and writirin
is constrai ned . we niiht expect ,any qiuestions and answers by
oati the t•eacher and the student. On the other hand, commands
Ie'L be less co:mmn. See Hall [in press] and :all 1 F reedl
S I far a .disussion of these conventions an
if it iculties they may cause.
Ln ir.portant feature of any behavior pattern is that it
cannot be applied in all situations, i.e., that there are'
i lici t con straints on its applicability. The r ee tin
at ern oc urs only . o• eetino: somreone; a w ai ter/c t oe
1pattern erisus only in a restaurant; a boss/emroloyee pattern
aeists only in the work situation; an oeven the
Lbecn inQi/learnin pattern applies only wthen we infer certain
con~itions. hut t e pattern also chances tne conditins for
interaction in that mutual recognition of a pattern lead to
shared expectations and beliefs about the interactions. The
i or t ance of social learning is evident ere as a
prerequisite to effe'ctive use of these action oatterns in
Scomp rehens ion.
- 1 s -
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4. Understand inp,- Nharrative Text
_. 1 _o rL n a-.ly1i3.
Tne connectivity o' story can be illustrated via a
lst2Li ra:.mar in much the same way that the structure of a
1in :le sentence can oe illutrat ed by a sent ence nar.
Hul::!elhart [1Q75] and others (Suttc n-.Smrith, _t _al., 1e7 ; "tein
. lenn, 1977; Mandler & Jonnson, 1\77) have shown that sucn
Tralars can account for the relative sa.lience of parts of
tory. In this section I want only to slketch the use of story
raL:ars (or story s hemas) and to point to both their
ui , uln:. zess -  and limitations.
?or the purpose here e will use the followini1 story
tkCen fror the first Winston reader [Firnan & MIaltoy, IaIn<
i'TH1 0D AND THE COCK
1. Once a dog and a cock went into the woods.
. Soon it grew dark.
3. The cock said, "Let us stay here all night. I will sleep
in this tree-top. You can sleep in the hollow trunk."
4. "Very well," said the dow.
o the dog and the cock went to sleep.
In the morning the cock began to crow, "Cock-a-doodle-do!
Cock-a-doodle-do!"
7. Mr. Fox heard him crow.
8. e said, "That is a cock crowing. He mnust be lost in t e
woods. I will eat him for my breakfast."
9. Soon Mr. Fox saw the cock in the tree-top.
- 1I -
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10. He said to himself, "Ha ! ha! a! ha! .What a fine
oreakfast I snal1 h1ave! I must make nin come down from
the tree. Ha.! cha! a! na! "
11. So he said to tie cook, "What a fine cock you are! ow
well you sino! ,ill you comoe to my. hourse for bre-akf'ast?"
12. Tre coc said, "Yes, than you, I will come, if my friend
may come, too ."
1 O. " h yes," sai3d te fox. "I will ask your friend. here
is je?"
14. The cock said, "My friend is in this hollow tree. He is
asleep. You must wake him."
l. 'ir. Fox said to hiimself, "Ha! na ! I shail . ave two cock
Sfor y breakfast !
16. Go he put his head into the hollow tree.
17. Tnen he said, "Will you come to my house for breakfast?"
1'4. Out jumped the doc and caucht vr. Fox by the nose.
1'u;1elhart [1q75] proposes a simple gramImar to account for
the structure of children's stories such as this. (He usjrs
diff erent forma1lism in more recent work [FRumehart, in
pres].) Here are the syntactic rules for his -raimmar:
Story -> Setting + Episode
Setting -> (States)*
dpisode -> Event + Reaction
Lvent -> {Episode ! Change-of-state Action Event + Evenc}
:eaction -> Internal Pesponse + Overt Resoonse
Internal Response -> {Emotion + Desire}
Overt Response -> {Action I (Attempt)*}
Attempt -> Plan + Application
Application -> (Preaction)* + Action + Consequence
Preaction -> Subgoal + (Attempt)*
Consequence -> {Reaction L vent}
Tne grammar can be read roughly as follows: "AP story consists
of a settin.g and an episode (we mi°ht 7eneralize this for the
diog and cock story to 'episodes'). Each eoisode comprises an
event and a reaction to the event. Etvents can be e isodes
_ p , -
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.i r selves, chanfes of state, actions, or pairs of events.
And 3s on. When we apply the :ram:ar to a story we :et a
tree structure representation. The portion of tne resulting
tree for segm.2 ents .- 11 of "The dor and the cock" is shown in
tilure 1 . The numoers refer to the se.ments of the story as
ive-n above.
iven a :~rarmmatical representation for a story one can
•ake predictions about recalls and :su;nmmaries based on the
structural relevance of parts of the story. SeP ments coded as
internal responses, for example, or deeply embedded se.ments,
a y be less easily remembered, Ste in . Glenn [10771 an
t-ranaler & Jonnson [1977] have done work alon t hese lines.
3 tiner than consider that work in det-ail, I want to make
.eneral observations here about some characteristics of a
tory grarmmar analysis. (I oelieve that similar cor:lments a.plv
to analyses in terms of Abelson's .[1975 and Schank's [n107F 1
scripts and plans, but I will restrict the example to the ,kind
of story scnema presented here.)
wnen one attemots to apply a story erammar it soon
becomes apparent that the interpretation of a segment of the
story can vary. For example, I coded (11), inviting the Cock
to creakfast, as an action to achieve the overall -oal stated
-"1 
-
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S Attempt
Plan Application
Preaction Action
(iSubgoal At
Subgoal / Attempt ' ..
1(1\\
Find
Cock
Application \
Action Consequence
for Cock "4
'''
Consequence
Consequence
I
Reacti
Internal
Response
Desire \
Reaction
Get Rid
\ Get Rid
f Foxo
/ \(Internal Overt
Response Response
Emotion Laugh
(10)
Fig. 1. A story grammar account of a portion of "The dog
and the cock."
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in (8), eating the Cock; but it could have been viewed a3 part
of toe overt response to (0), fiinding te cock. Furt ermore,
t , e choic e s ade oy tne " raar a poie r" in assi nin
structures are evident only in the final r product t e tre
repre sentation. For purposes such as DredictinC free oros
call performance the alte rn t ive structures i
ra - an :a.y be 1 iva le t . If our :oa 9 ev
acounit for variations in a child's so el of a story, th
a represe nta tion system tat as or of ns
G,1It i W J j
In a story such as "'The :og and the cock , which has two
prota. r. onis t s, we see a repeated pattern i. the tree . - .. v "
(see igure 2). This patte-rn appears whenever one h ter
acts in response to an action of the othYer. TIn dial-:ue, r
in general, in stories whose characters -nave independe- nt, b
interacting plans , one would ex ect to find th i.- f :: tte rn
Unf-ortunat.ely, we cannot view here the entire tree structure
for our example story, for in it on-e ouldJ s•ee the flw
t e s patterns, each sh owing <poan>-< c tion>-< n t e r na
response>-<overt response>-- n><plan>- etc. The story r.ri--nar is
a. reasonable way to lael this flow, but it says nothinr about
che procecsses whicon ;nera te. it. The rea-son is that neac
character's plan is based upon that character's beliefs about
- 2. -
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Attempt
Plan Application
I
Action Consequence
Reaction
Internal Overt
Response Response
Emotion Desire Attempt
Fig. 2. A common pattern found in the story grammar analysis
of "The dog and the cock."
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tays to attain his or her goals. Thus the processes that
account for a <plan>-<action>-<internal response>-<overt
response> sequence must be explained in terms of a model of
tle character, not just the story itself.
I final point is that the story rammnar cannot showj how
elements of a setting or an inte-rnal resoonse are liinked t
trie plans and actions of the characters. I would expect tfnt
setting and internal response information is easily lost
unless it is critical to the account of a p lan . A
re,.presentation that made these links explicit could be used to
predict relative salience of those non-action parts of a
story.
4.2 Story Model Analysis
The preceding section discusses a method of story
analysis that explains some important features of stories.
The method has an important limitation, in that it simply
ig.nores the internal structure of plans, and hence of the
beliefs of cnaracters about actions that occur. The best way
to snow this is to present an alternative analysis that
explicitly incorporates tne structure of plans, beliefs and
social actions.
- 3F -
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ror comparison purposes we will aa.ain use "The do and
t-e cocK." What we find after just a cursory analysis is that
one elements of the story (facts, actions, presuppositions,
an. so on) .ibust be relativised with respect to the reader. In
ot!er words, tie comprehension process and goal should be
infined not in terms of propositions of the form, P, but in
ter.s of propositions of the form, Reader-believes (P ).
rurtherrmore, many of tne reader's beliefs are in turn beliefs
aicou;t beliefs of the characters. The reader must recor gnize,
for example, taat the Fox believes that he wants to convince
ite Cock that the Fox wants the Cook as a 7uest for breakfast
(andi not as the cma in ourse). 'Thus, we need to represent a
proposition of tne form, Reader-bel ieves (Fox-b ieves
(Fox-wants (Cock-believes (Fox-bieveves (Fox-wants (P)))))),
1wnere... P is "the Cock comes as a ;ruest for breakfast,."
Figures ? and i4 snow a partial, and somewhat suprfi cial
analysis of segments 8-12 of "The dog and the cook." in fact,
it shows only propositions that are embedded within the
reacer's beliefs about the fox's beliefs about the fox's
wants. A complete analysis would show the reader's beliefs
aoout the dog's and the cock's beliefs, as well as the
reader's "absolute" beliefs. In this story, as in many
otiers, part of tne interest lies in the discreoancies amona
- 26 -
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Fox eat-breakfast
ins ance (10)
Cocks-are- Cock-J
good-to-eat instance good-t
Cock-is-eat
support catch-and-(
, /8
Cock wants
(Cock come-
down-from-tree)
sub outcome
Cock wants
(Cock come-to-
Fox house-for-
breakfast)
is- .-- .
to-eat support
sy-to
eat
owant
precondition
want
precondition
Fox eat-Cock-
for-breakfast
(8)
pre ondition
Fox hold-Cock
precondition
Fox is-near-Cock
outcome
Fox is-pleased
Fox sees
(Cock-in-tree)
(9)
precondition
Cock come- Cock in-tree
down-from-tree support
(10)
sub -outcome
Cock come-to-Fox-
house-for-breakfast
spport
Cock believes
(Fox-is-sincere)
Fig. 3. A portion of a plan and social analysis of segments
8-10 of "The dog and the cock."
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Cock crows
support
(11)
Cock likes-to-
be-told-he-
sings-well
insince
Cocks-like-to-
be-told-they-
sing-well
^-- --------- ^-
Fox flatter Fox request(Cock
__ (Cock sings) come-to-Fox-house-
sup. for-breakfast
outcome
Cock will-do
what-Fox-
requests
Cock likes-to-
eat-breakfast
Cock wants
(Cock come-to-Fox-
house-for-breakfast)
Cock's friend-
is-a-Cock
Cock's friend
likes-to-eat-
breakfast
Cocks-like-
S--- to-eat-
sp breakfast
N
Cock's friend
- wants (Cock's-
sup. friend-come-
to-Fox-house-
for-breakfast)
P3C.
Cock agrees \
(Cock come-to-
Fox-house-for- p
breakfast)
(12)
Cock request
(friend come- -
to-Fox-house- oc.
for-kfra , t)'
Cock believes
(Fox-is-sincere)
Cock's friend
can(Cock's
friend -come-to-
Fox-house-for-
breakfast)
Cock's friend
is-near-Cock
Fig. 4i. A portion of a plan and social action analysis of
segments 11-12 of "The dog and the cock."
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t ae rearer's model of the world (that is, the world defined in
the story), and his or her models of the characters' models.
here, it is critical for the reader to recornize differences
between the fox's r:model (as shown in Fifures : and . ) and the
cock' s.
To ta.e just one exampl, , consider the belief, "CoieC
is-easy-to-catch-and-eat", as shown in Figure 3. The suOport
for this belief is not shown in the fiure, ut we i:nu.t
iypobhesize that it consists of at least the tvwo beliefs,
"lost-animals-are-e asy-to-cat c-and-eat" a• " Coc
is-lost-in-woods." The fox's subsequent actions are most
easily interpreted in ter:.ns of tis bcelief that he can easil
cattn and eat the coc . Conflict in the olot is Cr vided by
the belief that the cock believes otherwise.
The fox's belief that the cock will be easy to catch
provides support for his top-level want, "Fox
.eat-Cock-for-breakfast." This want becomes the imoetus for
the fox's actions. AIs readers we _miht ima.:ine that ne be ins
to f'orulate a plan as follows:
(1) In order to eat the cock, he must be holding hi.m;
(2) therefore the cock .ust be nearby;
(3) tnis will happen if the cock descends from the tree;
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(0) ne will come down if he wants to;
(5) ne will want to it he wants to join the fox for breakfast;
(6) ne .nay want to do tnat if he trusts the fox and, if the fox
asks hii nicely;
(7) ne askin will tb more successful if it is acc.onied by
Slattery.
Eased on this plan (or belief based hyoothesis about
t.!tainin e th  -oa.l), tie fox acts by sayin. ,
"nnat a fine cock you are! Fow well you sin•! ill
you come to my house for breakfast?"
!ote tnat 1these utterances m:ake sense only it we reco7nize a
plan of tne sort sketche: in ( 1)-(7) above. F'urthermore ,
reco.1rnition of tnis plan reinforces a classic sc'nema about
toxes in fables, i.e., that they are clever and deceitful, but
often not clever enough.
In addition to formulating his own plans, the fox must
simulate the plan formulation of the cock in order to account
for the cock's actions. Fi.ure i shows a iortion of the
beliefs he righht nave about the cock's plans, Note that (fro'
the fox's point of view) the cock's actions are both
understandable and desirable. Thus the fox believes his
- O0 -
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deception is working, a belief essential to the development of
mne plot.
Figures 3 and I do not show even all of the fox's
oeliefs. For example, one path to the belief that the cock's
friend is a cock is shown, but the fox could also infer this
from t1 e princiole of uantit_ [GGrice, 1O7T]:
(1) The friend of a cock is a cock (so the fox believes);
(2) a different kind of friend would be highly unusual;
(3) one should include in an utterance (or conversat ional
turn) highly unusual, yet relevant information (the
quantity principle);
(4) without contrary indications, the cock can be assumed to
oe following the rules of conversation.
This method of analysis is clearly not story analysis,
out story model analysis; that is, we analyze the model a
"typical" reader constructs for the story. Ideally, we would
like to be able to analyze a particular reader's modl and
compare it to other models. The re.presentation makes it
possible to look for differences in beliefs to account for
differing interpretations.
- 31 -
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Tnere are other imoortant advantaues to this approach.
It allows explicit representation of the beliefs supporting a
plan, and tnus makes it possible to see how differences in
beliefs account for differin• plans. It also makes ~ exlicit
tue issue of conflicting beliefs and shows how the plans of
dirferent characters can interact. Finally, it cives a way
i in tegrating speech acts (even multiple speech acts as ina
Figure 4) with other actions. One im•portant drawback, of
course, is that such an analysis is far from automatic and to
be cone well requires detailed examinations of stories as,
SUnder tandini the Author'l s Intentions
An important step in the comprehension process is
fiouring out what the discourse is about and what the writer's
intentions are. To some extent the writer can. sinal
in entions via the structure\ of the text. However the lack of
-a one-to-one correspondence between text structure and purrose
requires the reader to infer intentions on the basis of
Knowledge of the writer in -much the same way as be or she
infers intentions of characters in a story. Failure to
understand the author's intentions can cause problems for all
levels of comprehension, from that of' "getting the main idea"
to the subtle insiants expected of sRkilled readers.
- •? -
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At tihe crudest level a reader must divine enough of the
purpose of a. passage to know what questions should be asked or
wnat schemata to apply in comprehending. It is a commonplace
observation that the best readers know more about the process
they are engaged in when readinrg more and quickly see elements
in a text in termns of cheir larger functional role, e. ,., a
descriptive passage as a staTe setter. (The extent to vhicn
tlese abilities are automatic rather than evidence of
mie ta-comnprehension is still not clear.)
UsinT a version of "The do: and the cock' written in a
',ore modern style and with syntax and vocabulary more
appropriate to the m.iddle grades, we saw a -zood examrole of the
need to recognize the author's intention. One child (ae 11),
who happened to be a very good reader, nad no trouble with the
story, recognizing easily the flattery and trickery aspects of
the plot. He volunteered a description of a schema for foxes
in stories of this type, in which the fox is seen to be .reedy
or villainous, plotting to gain his evil ends, ultimately
trieKing himself, etc. Furthermore, he recognized that this
characterization applies not to foxes, but only to foxes in
tories of' this type, i.e., he knew that he was reading a
particular kind of story, intended to be entertaining, oerhaps
to impart a moral, but not to persuade, inform, criticize, or
- ? .,-
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any of a number of other social actions an author could be
performing. A second child (age 10), who happened to have had
trouble with previous stories, had difficulty with this one as
well. Not surprisingly, she gave little indication of knowin.
eitner the fox schema mentioned above, nor that schema as
instantiated by this story. ie can only speculate about the
rea.sons for the dif fering abilities we observed; but it is
clear that understanding the purpose of the story played an
imlportant role in recognizing what higher level schemata to
apply and hence to understanding the story itself.
In cases where a reader does understand adequately, the
ability to perceive the author's intentions can still make the
difference between minimally sufficient comprehension and deec
urnerstanding of a text. This difference has irmplications for
tne accumulation of knowledge from text, out, more
im.portantly, for motivation and developrment of Critical
reading, writing and thinking. One example (from a technical
article) should illustrate the skill that is needed; we can
say little at this time however, about how a reader acquires
tnis skill.
In the article, the author states that a particular
theory of semantics is perhaps useful for the computerization
of language but not as part of a general theory of lansuage.
. .11 _
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,o;e readers of this article interpreted the statement (and
tne supporting discussion) as a sugestion, i.e., that the
author was distinguishing two possible applications of the
theory he was discussing, and then s u7 g esting the more
appropriate application. A discussion held among several
people who read the article concluded with a contrary
interpretation. The statement was seen, not as a serious
.usuggestion, but rather (or more importantly) as a crit icis i.
Ti'ne readers, applying their beliefs about the beliefs of the
author and the creators of' the .semantic theory, concluded that
the statement was saying that the purported ceneral theory
could be applied only in the "vain" attempt to cos".uterize
languag.e. Their beliefs about the author's beliefs indicated
that this would be a quite damning criticism, and not just a
friendly suggestion.
The issue is not whether these readers were correct, for
a. text can always be re-interpreted in the light of' different
beliefs. The important points are (1) the group discussion
convinced several readers that the criticism interpretation
was more valid, thus enriching tneir understanding of the
article, and (2) in order to reach the criticism
interpretation they had to apply a great amount of Knowledge
about the author, his use of a word like "computerize," and
...
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his purpose in writing, A. general theory of reading
comprehension should ultimately tive an account of this
process, a process in which the structural and context-free
(if such there be) meanin7 aspects of lan.uage are embedded in
the social function the language serves.
6. Iplications for Teaching1
, We simply do not know the extent to which children r-ay
differ in tneir understanding of social actions and olans, but
early work [Hall, in press] sutests that. cultural differences
in1 terms of function may be -reater than ohonetic, syntactic
or semantic diftferences; furthermore, that serious
comprehension difficulties can result when there is a mis.match
between the understandings of a writer and those of a reader.
A test designer must work under the primary assumption that an
"error" may reflect differences between the reader and the
writer regarding what counts as a -iven social action or what
prerequisites there are to inferring a particular oal.
If it is true that we can best understand a linguistic
act (whether spoken or written) as a social action, then an
adequate test of reading comprehension should distinguish
oetween a reader's skill at buildinrg a model for a text and
nis or her knowledge of social roles, social behavior
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patterns, and the relevant linguistic conventions. It is also
important for the test to identify differences betweenthe
*writer's and the reader's beliefs about the world. That most
reading cowmprehension tests ignore these issues is a statement
on the potential cultural bias inherent in the tests. It rmay
also provide an explanation for the limited success of
attempts to select "culture-free" items for tests,
Tne discussion above miaht sure st that we teach about
social actions and plans directly. A better idea would be to
encourage a child to treat written lan uage as the skilled
reader does, as a tool with a purpose. This leads one to ask
questions such as: )  hat is the author trying to say? What
makes you think so? Is the text convincing?
Skilled readers do not look for details without reasons,
yet that is often suggested implicitly by exercises such as
"find the three causes , given by the author," We snould instead
be asking the student to find his or her interpretation of a
text and then to support that interpretation, stating details
whieere appropriate. The end may be the same, but the means
reflect profoundly different conceptions of what readinr is
all about.
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Similarly, a student should not just look for actions of
cnaracters in a story but for wy characters act as they do.
hi s s ugests a de-emphasis of training for literal
comprehension. It may be easier to teach and assess literal
comprehension but skilled reading demands going beyond that,
and mnay even be hampered by an over-reliance on the explicitly
stated actions and beliefs in a story.
7. •"'urther Research
Tne issues discussed in this paper are only be.-innin.: c,-
be explored. We are not much beyond the anecdotal staae in
aescribing how prior beliefs and organizing schernas are us
in recognizing plans, We can say even less about now peoOp!l
manag•e the complex hypothesis formation task they are given by
a story or dialogue.
we do know some ways of dealing with. complexity of this
sort. One can store frequently used patterns, i.e., "Cn ou
... ?" often signifies a request for action and not
information about ability, But how are these conventions
learned? How do we know when one has failed? What are the
forms for the discourse rather than the sentence, level?
A N,.a -
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The models discussed .herein stress the building of
representations for the plans and beliefs of characters in
stories and for those of authors. As such, they explain a lot
about connectivity of discourse and suggest accounts of many
reading comprehension difficulties. But how do we examine a
person's oeliefs, not to '-entior their beliefs about the
beliefs of otners? If a person builds the "correct" model for
a text we may be able to discover that, but incorrect models
,ay rest on beliefs that are obscure even to the reader.
All this says only that we should not over-simplify the
issues. wve need research on how children first learn and use
language, especially on their models of lanrpua e function. We
need better analyses of texts that consider more directly the
alternative readings implied by different beliefs. we shou]ld
study the beliefs that children . have about social
relationships and the use of lan.uage. We also need .ore worn
on now the apparently well developed skills children have for
oral discourse transfer to, interfere with, or are orthoconal
to the corresponding skills for written material. Finally, we
need a better model of how knowledge about linguistic forms,
prose structure, social relationships and purposeful action
can be integrated to impose structure on a text.
- ^Q -
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